























A. CONCEPTION OF CONTRABAND 
The foundation of the law of contraband must be found in the belligerent 
claim to prevent an enemy from receiving such goods as will enable him the 
more effectively to wage war. The law of contraband therefore deals with 
the extent to which this belligerent claim has been accorded legal recogni-
tion. Here, as elsewhere, it will be useful to begin the discussion with a 
brief statement of the basic features of this law as they appeared in the 
period preceding the outbreak of World War I. 
Purpose and destination have always formed the distinguishing criteria 
of contraband. With respect to the first of these criteria the traditional 
law effected a threefold division: articles used primarily (i.e., specialized) 
for war, articles equally susceptible of use for warlike or for peaceful pur-
poses, and articles either not susceptible of use in war or-though of such 
possible use-granted exemption on humanitarian grounds. The first 
category could be seized if found destined to territory belonging to or occu-
pied by an enemy, or the armed forces of an enemy, the nature of the goods 
making their use for hostile purposes a near certainty once they had en-
tered the belligerent's jurisdiction. The second category, known as con-
ditional contraband, could be seized only if found to be destined for delivery 
to an enemy government or to its armed forces, thus resolving the uncer-
tainty as to the purpose for which the goods would be used. The third 
category, known as free goods, were exempt from seizure without consid-
eration of their destination. 1 
The foregoing may be taken to represent the basic framework of the 
traditional law of contraband, and in a sense it is true that this framework 
remain~ valid even today.2 Susceptibility of use in war and hostile destina-
tion still form the essential conditions that must be present if goods are to 
be seized as contraband of war. It is a different matter, however, to inquire 
1 It is also desirable to note that the law of contraband applies to neutral owned goods shipped 
aboard either a neutral or an enemy vessel as well as to enemy owned goods shipped aboard a 
neutral vessel. This for the reason that according to Article 2. of the Declaration of Paris the 
neutral flag covers enemy goods, with the exception of contraband, and-according to Article 
3-neutral goods under an enemy flag are not liable to seizure, contraband excepted. In practice, 
however, the prevention of contraband carriage is concerned primarily with neutral commerce. 
This is particularly true in view of recent developments which have rendered Articles 2. and 3 
of the Declaration of Paris almost inoperative. 
2 Law of Naval Warfare, Article 631a. 
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how meaningful it may be to assert that the traditional basis of the law of 
contraband remains unchanged in view of belligerent practices during the 
two World Wars. For these practices have succeeded in effecting a radical 
transformation even while retaining the traditional forms. Whereas in an 
earlier era the law of contraband tended to represent a compromise between 
the conflicting claims of neutral and belligerent, recent practice represents 
the successful realization of the belligerent aim of preventing almost any 
type of goods from reaching an enemy. In this process the traditional dis-
tinction between absolute and conditional contraband, though formally 
retained, has become a distinction without a difference. The category of 
free goods, also retained in form, has shrunk to a vanishing point. In 
both global conflicts the major disputes between neutral and belligerent 
centered primarily upon the specific methods adopted by belligerents in pur-
suing the avowed goal of seizing or destroying practically the whole of an 
enemy's imports. But the legitimacy of this goal became a subordinate 
question even during World War I, and in the second World War neutral 
protests against the all-inclusive character of belligerent contraband lists 
assumed an almost perfunctory character. 3 
In so reducing the area of freedom formerly enjoyed by neutrals, belliger-
ents received a substantial measure of support from the very uncertainty 
marking nineteenth century practice. The law of contraband had always 
provided the controversial core of neutral-belligerent relations, and a num-
ber of disputed issues had never been clearly resolved. Once hostilities 
broke out in 1914 ample opportunity was therefore provided belligerents to 
pursue courses of action whose unlawful character could hardly be regarded 
as self-evident, despite neutral, and enemy, assertions to this effect. 
This opportunity afforded belligerents can be attributed in part to the 
absence of any clear restraint upon the admitted right of a state to draw up 
contraband lists once it became involved in war. 4 The position of belliger-
3 Thus several neutral states protested against the British contraband list issued in Septem-
ber 1939, though the protests were neither energetically pressed nor seriously received. On 
October 3, 1939 the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics resolved: "To register its 
opposition to the placing of foodstuffs and clothing intended for civilian populations, not 
destined directly or indirectly for the use of a belligerent government or its armed forces, on 
lists of contraband." A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), Supp., p. 14. 
4 Apart, of course, from those limitations imposed by treaty. During the 18th and 19th 
centuries a number of bilateral treaties were concluded defining the articles to be considered 
contraband in the event of a war in which one of the parties to the treaty was a panicipant. 
But the significance of these treaties is now almost entirely histodcal. At present, the only 
conventional restrictions of a multilateral character imposed upon belligerents in drawing up 
contraband lists are those contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention ~elative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Article 2.3 of this Convention obligates the contracting 
parties to "allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects 
necessary for religion:) worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, 
even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments 
of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers 
and maternity cases.'' But this obligation of belligerents is subject to the conditions that the 
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ents has been not merely to contend that the precise nature of contraband 
lists is necessarily dependent upon the concrete circumstances of the war-
which is true enough-but that the significance of these circumstances, and 
hence the particular items to be classified as contraband, must be left to the 
determination of the belligerents 5- an altogether different and fre-
quently controverted claim. The latter contention must imply that the 
only limitations placed upon the belligerent's discretion in devising his 
contraband lists are those imposed by the general rules defining the nature 
of contraband goods. On the other hand, states not involved in hostilities 
have sought to place more precise restrictions upon the discretion claimed 
by belligerents. At the very least, neutrals have maintained that belliger-
ents cannot act in con1plete disregard of neutral opinion when devising 
contraband lists. 
In Articles 2.2. through 2.9 of the unratified Declaration of London the at-
tempt was made to compromise the issue by listing articles that might 
" without notice" be regarded as absolute contraband and to which further 
articles "exclusively used for w ar" could be added by means of a notified 
declaration addressed to other states. Similar provision w as made for 
articles that could be treated without notice as conditional contraband and 
to which further articles and materials ' 'susceptible of use in war as well as 
party allowing for the free passage of these goods has no "serious reasons for fearing: (a) that 
the consignments may be diverted from their destination, (b) that the control may not be 
effective, or (c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the 
enemy through the substitution of the ... consignments for goods which would otherwise 
be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or 
faculties as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods." Article 59 of the 
same convention provides for the passage of certain goods (e. g., foodstuffs, medical supplies 
and clothing) to occupied territory ''if the whole or part of the population of an occupied 
territory is inadequately supplied." Nevertheless, the state granting such passage shall have 
the right "to search the consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed times 
and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power that these consign-
ments are to be used for the relief of the needy population and are not to be used for the benefit 
of the Occupying Power."-These provisions may be regarded as a striking illustration of the 
extent to which states have granted recognition-in a humanitarian convention-to the virtual 
absence of restraints upon the belligerent freedom to deprive an enemy of all goods, even those 
expressly designed to serve humanitarian purposes. For the discretion given to belligerents in 
Articles 2.3 and 59 is of such a character as to nullify, for practical purposes, the obligations 
ostensibly undertaken in these provisions. 
Finally, note should be taken of the customary practice of permitting free passage of articles 
serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded of the enemy. See Article 631c (2.), Law of 
Naval Warfare. Also exempt from seizure, by custom, are articles intended exclusively for the 
use of the crew and passengers of a vessel. 
5 Thus the British Government, in replying on November 2.0, 1939 to earlier protests made 
by the Netherlands' Government against the former's contraband lists, took the usual belligerent 
position in declaring that: "It is the undoubted right in international law of a belligerent 
Power to declare what articles it will consider as contraband, within the general definition of 
contraband as being any article of use for the prosecution of war." cited in Hackworth, Vol. 
VII, op. cit., p. 2.6. 
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for purposes of peace" could be added by proper notification. Finally, the 
Declaration contained a list of articles and tnaterials "not to be declared 
contraband of war." 
It would serve little purpose to retrace here the steps by which these pro-
visions, though provisionally adopted by the belligerents in 1914, were 
abandoned. \Vithin a brief period of time most of the items listed by the 
Declaration of London as free had been shifted to the category of condi-
tional contraband, and a large number of articles originally listed as condi-
tional contraband were moved to the category of absolute contraband. In 
each instance belligerent justification for expanding contraband lists fol-
lowed a uniform pattern. The novel circumstances in which hostilities 
were being conducted were alleged to have resulted in rendering almost all 
goods susceptible of use in war. In addition, these same circumstances were 
held to have resolved the otherwise ambiguous character of numerous 
articles formerly considered as conditional contraband; the use of these 
articles for warlike purposes now being considered so probable as to justify 
their reclassification within the category of absolute contraband. 6 
By the end of World War I it was no longer expedient to list each separate 
item declared to constitute either absolute or conditional contraband. In-
stead, the new belligerent procedure-introduced in the 1917 Instructions 
For the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare-was to list only 
a few broad categories within which particular items were considered to 
6 In this manner the "nature" of absolute contraband:underwent a subtle transformation. It 
can be argued that the description given absolute contraband always varied to some extent. 
Nevertheless, the traditional meaning-according to even the most liberal interpretation-was 
a strict one. Absolute contraband consisted of goods "specialized for war," or, in the words 
of Article 34 of the U.S. Naval War Code of 1900, of goods "primarily and ordinarily used for 
military purposes in time of war." Belligerents were not justified, however, in listing items 
as absolute contraband simply because there was a probability-even a certainty-that a part 
of these goods would be used for warlike purposes. It was precisely this latter consideration 
that formed the justification for conditional contraband; the ambiguity attached to the latter 
being removed when it was once established that they were destined to the armed forces of 
the enemy. Yet, belligerent practice during the two World Wars was not only to do away 
with the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband by giving to both a common 
destination (a point to be dealt with shortly) but also by alleging that a large portion of the 
goods in question (e. g., fuel and lubricants) would be used for warlike purposes. This latter 
claim may be readily admitted; a portion of almost any type of goods will be consumed by the 
military effort. The same was also true of an earlier era, however, though it did not serve 
to classify goods as absolute contraband. The point of all this is not, as has been suggested, 
"that while such articles may be of ambiguous use, abstractly speaking, in a particular stage 
of a particular war and as against a particular enemy there may be no ambiguity whatsoever 
about the use to which they will be put if they reach that enemy." Stone, op. cit., p. 481. 
On the contrary, even in "total war" an appreciable uncertainty remai_ns over the use to which 
a particular shipment of goods may be put. What is not uncertain is that a part of the total 
quantity of shipments will most assuredly be used for warlike purposes; and it has been on this 
basis that belligerents have declared such goods to be absolute contraband. But on this reason-· 
ing it is difficult to see the logic in placing fuel on the list of absolute contraband and food 
on the conditional list, though belligerents did just this even in \Vorld War II. 
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fall. Upon the outbreak of war in 1939 this procedure was adopted by 
several of the major belligerents, although some states retained the former 
practice of publishing detailed lists. In either case, the central feature 
common to the belligerent contraband lists was their all embracing 
character. 7 
B. CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND: THE PROBLEM OF 
DESTINATION 
Carriage of contraband occurs only when goods whose nature renders 
them of use in war are found to have a hostile destination. It has earlier 
been observed that according to the traditional law the hostile destination 
required of goods before they could be seized and condemned as contraband 
of war turned upon the nature of the goods. In the case of goods used 
primarily for war (absolute contraband) the territory belonging to or occu-
pied by an enemy, or the armed forces of an enemy, formed the required 
7 The contraband list proclaimed by Great Britain in September 1939, and adopted by Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia and France, was closely patterned after the list contained in Article 2.4 
of the U.S. Navy's 1917 Instrttctions. The British list read as follows: 
"Schedule I. 
Absolute Contraband 
(a) All kinds of arms, ammunition, explosives, chemicals, or appliances suitable for use 
in chemical warfare and machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof; 
articles necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; 
articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients. 
(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means of, transportation on land, in the water 
or air, and machines used in their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof, instruments, 
articles, or animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their 
manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or 
ingredients. 
(c) All means of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipments, maps, 
pictures, papers and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying 
on hostile operation; articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture or use. 
(d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt; also metal, materials, dies, plates, machin-
ery, or other articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture. 
Schedule II. 
Conditional Contraband 
(e) All kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing and articles and materials 
used in their production." U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I944-45, 
pp. 91-92.· 
Article 2.2. of the German Prize Law Code of August 2.8, 1939, declared as absolute contraband 
"all articles and materials which: I. Directly serve the land, naval or air armament and 2.. 
Are consigned to the enemy territory or the armed forces." This was soon changed, however, 
by an absolute contraband list that closely paralleled the Allied list. On September 12., 1939, 
the German Government declared "foodstuffs (including live animals) beverages and tobacco 
and the like, fodder and clothing; articles and materials used for their preparation or manu-
facture" to be conditional contraband. -In effect, the major belligerents therefore had a com-
mon contraband list. 
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destination. 8 Goods possessing an ambiguous nature (conditional contra-
band) required a destination to the government authorities or to the arm~cl 
forces of an enemy state. 9 
It is clear that this differentiation in destination must depend, in turn, 
upon the assumption that belligerents will be able and willing to make a 
reasonable clear distinction between the combatant forces and the civilian 
population of an enemy. Once the latter distinction is discarded it is no 
longer meaningful to distinguish between absolute and conditional contra-
band, since the destination required of all goods susceptible of use in war 
will then be assimilated to the destination formerly reserved only for 
absolute contraband. It was precisely this development that marked 
belligerent practice almost from the initial stages of World War I. The 
belligerents contended that given the circumstances it was no longer possible 
s And Article 3r of the Declaration of London reflected the customary law in stating that 
the proof required for establishing hostile destination in the case of absolute contraband is 
complete "(r) when the goods are documented to be discharged in a port of the enemy, or to 
be delivered to his armed forces," and "(1-) when the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or 
when she is to touch at a port of the enemy or to join his armed forces, before arriving at the 
neutral port for which the goods are documented." According to Article 31- the ship's papers 
were to be considered conclusive unless the vessel was found to have deviated from her route 
and unable to account properly for such deviation. But ship's papers have never been regarded as 
conclusive if facts establish their contents to be false. 
9 But pre-World War I practice had never clearly resolved the controversy over the pre-
sumptions open to belligerents with respect to the destination required for conditional contra-
band. The importance of this matter is clear, since once a presumption of enemy destination 
has been made the claimant has the burden of establishing innocent destination before a prize 
court in order to obtain restitution of goods seized. British practice in the r9th century dis-
tinguished between goods destined to an enemy port used primarily for commercial purposes 
and goods destined to enemy ports serving the armed forces. In the latter instance enemy 
destination was presumed for goods consisting of conditional contraband. However, Article 
34 of the Declaration of London stated that, with respect to conditional contraband, enemy 
destination is presumed "if the consignment is addressed to enemy authorities, or to a merchant, 
established in the enemy country, and when it is well known that this merchant supplies articles 
and materials of this kind to the enemy," or, if goods are "destined to a fortified place of the 
enemy, or to another place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy." These pre-
sumptions of enemy destination could be rebutted, but then the burden of proof would fall 
upon the neutral claimant. There is no question but that as judged by r9th century practice 
Article 34 represented a considerable concession to belligerent claims and prepared the way 
for the later practices of belligerents in World War I. Writing shortly before the outbreak of 
World War I, John Bassett Moore prophetically observed ofthisprovision that: "These· grounds 
of inference are so vague and general that they would seem to justify in almost any Gase the 
presumption that the cargo, if bound to an enemy port, was 'destined for the use of the enemy 
forces or of a government department of the enemy state.' Any merchant established in the 
enemy country, who deals in the things described, will sell them to the government; and 
if it becomes public that he does so it will be 'well known' that he· supplies them. Again; 
practically every important port is a 'fortified place;' and yet the existence of fortifications 
would usually bear no relation whatever to the eventual use of provisions and various other' 
articles mentioned. Nor can it be denied that, with well kept highways, almost any place 
may serve as a 'base' for supplying the armed forces of an enemy." The Collected Papers of John 
Bassett Moore, (1944) Vol. VI, p. 57 (address on "Contraband of War, February 1-, r9r1-). 
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to distinguish w ith sufficient clarity between goods destined for the use of 
the armed forces and goods intended for civilian consumption. These 
circumstances were alleged to be the large proportion of the enemy popula-
tion taking an active part in the 1nilitary effort and the strict control 
exercised over all enemy imports through policies of requisition and ration-
ing. The same ci rcumstances appeared in a still more pronounced form in 
World War II, and belligerents responded by once again 1naking enemy 
territory the requisite hostile destination for seizure and subsequent con-
demnation of all goods deemed susceptible of being put to a warlike use.I0 
The major problem remains, however, since it is still necessary for a 
belligerent to establish an enemy destination in order to condemn goods as 
contraband of war. In the simplest case involving the direct carriage of 
contraband, where the vessel is encountered carrying goods susceptible of 
use in war and documented to be discharged in an enemy port, no difficulty 
will normally arise. 11 But experience has shown that under modern con-
ditions the direct carriage of contraband is likely to prove the exception 
rather than the rule. In the case of a belligerent adjoined by neutral states, 
as was Germany in both World Wars, the carriage of contraband will 
almost invariably be indirect, through the ports of adjacent neutrals, and 
the belligerent's problem of contraband control will center very largely 
upon the extent of the right to intercept goods documented to neutral ports 
though having-or suspected of having-an ultimate enemy destination. 
10 The major steps in this development-facilitated by Article 34 of the Declaration of Lon-
don-may be briefly traced. By 1915 Germany had declared that almost every major port in 
the British Isles was either a "fortified place" or a base for serving the armed forces. The 
effect of this action was to abandon the distinction between absolute and conditional contra-
band, even while claiming- as Germany did so claim-to have upheld it. British practice 
followed along similar lines, and in April 1916 the British Government openly abandoned the 
attempt to distinguish between the destinations formerly required of conditional and absolute 
contraband. But this distinction had already been abandoned by the British Prize Court. 
Thus in The Kim and Othet· Vessels [1915] it was declared, in condemning foodstuffs held to be 
destined to Germany, that: "Apart altogether from the special adaptability of these cargoes 
for the armed forces, and the highly probable inference that they were destined for the forces, 
even assuming that they were indiscriminately distributed between the military and civilian 
population, a very large proportion would necessarily be used by the military forces. 3 Lloyds 
Prize Cases, p. 367. 
In World War II the issue was never in any doubt, given the total character of each bellig-
erent's war effort. Thus in The Alwaki and Other Vessels [1940], the British Prize Court de-
clared, in condemning foodstuffs held to be destined to Germany, that "there is the clearest 
possible evidence of German decrees which, to put it quite shortly, impose Government control 
on all these articles and prescribe that they are automatically seized at the moment of crossing 
the frontier or, to put it more accurately, at the moment of coming into the customs house." 
Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1938-4o), Case No. 2.2.3, p. 586. 
11 Nor will any difficulty normally arise even when cargo is found to be documented to a 
neutral port, if the vessel is to touch at an enemy port on its way to the neutral port or if the 
vessel is encountered having deviated from the route indicated on the ship's papers. In either 
case the goods on board may be presumed to have an enemy destination; the destination of the 
goods being assimilated to the least favorable destination of the vessel. 
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Over the basic principle governing such cases involving the indirect carriage 
of contraband-and most appropriately termed the principle of ultimate 
enemy destination-there can no longer be any real doubt. i,2 Goods docu-
mented to neutral ports and consigned to persons in neutral territory are 
nevertheless liable to seizure at any time after leaving their port of origin 
if it can be shown that the ostensible neutral destination serves only as an 
intermediate point for further transit-whether by land, sea or air-to an 
enemy. 13 
At the same time, the specific consequences following upon the applica-
tion of this principle to the carriage of contraband have not only been 
extremely far-reaching in practice but have provoked controversies be-
tween neutral and belligerent that are still far from being satisfactorily 
resolved. Nor are the reasons that have led to these controversies-in 
which neutrals have alleged unwarranted interference with thei1· legitimate 
12 The neutral trader's purpose in making such circuitous voyages is clear. Since goods 
destined for use in neutral territory are exempt from belligerent interference, the risks incurred 
in undertaking to trade in contraband would be considerably reduced provided only that cargo 
could enjoy exemption from seizure simply because documented to a neutral port. If the con-
traband goods are to be carried from the neutral port to an enemy destination by sea, whether 
in the same vessel (continuous voyage) or after being reshipped in another vessel (continuous 
transport), the period of liability to seizure would then be reduced to the latter leg of the 
voyage. If, on the other hand, the goods are to be transported to an enemy, after reaching a 
neutral port, by land or by inland waterway (continuous transport), no risk would be run at all. 
The application to contraband of the principle of continuous voyage, or transport, was first 
undertaken by American prize courts during the period of the Civil War. However, these 
decisions were confined to the condemnation of goods consisting of absolute contraband. At 
the time, the majority of writers-and states-strongly condemned the decisions. But Great 
Britain, whose trade was the most directly affected, did not protest. In r9oo, during the Boer 
War, the British sought to apply the principle-as a belligerent-against German merchant 
vessels and met with strong German protests. The matter remained unsettled down to the 
outbreak of World War I, despite the well known compromise attempted in the Declaration of 
London to apply the principle of ultimate enemy destination to absolute contraband (Article 30) 
though not to conditional contraband (Article 35). Great Britain abandoned the compromise 
almost directly upon the initiation of hostilities, and in taking this action was followed by 
her Allies. In British prize law rejection of the compromise sought by the Declaration of 
London came in The Kim and Other Vessels [r9r5], 3 Lloyds Prize Cases, pp. 355-9. In April 1915 
Germany also abandoned Article 35 of the Declaration of London, though treating her action 
as a retaliatory measure taken against the unlawful action of the Allies. Paragraphs 69 and 70 
of the U. S. Navy's 1917 Instructions expressly endorsed the application of the principle of ulti-
mate enemy destination to both absolute and conditional contraband. A detailed treatment 
of the historical development of the principle of continuous voyage through World War I 
may be found in H. W. Briggs, The Doctrine of Continttous Voyage (r92.6). 
In World War II continued controversy over the application of the principle of ultimate 
enemy destination to conditional contraband almost disappeared. However, Article 2.4 of the 
German Prize Law Code of August 2.8, 1939 did declare that conditional contraband is not. 
liable to capture if discharged in a neutral port "on condition of reciprocal procedure on the 
part of the enemy." The "reciprocal procedure" not being forthcoming Germany abandoned 
this provision. 
l3 See Law of Naval Watfare, Article 631c. 
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trade-hard to trace. It cannot be etnphasized too strongly that the tra-
ditional system regulating trade in contraband had been based largely 
upon the assumption that the destination of a cargo would generally be 
the same as that of the vessel in which it was carried. This assumption 
goes far in explaining the traditional methods of contraband control as 
well as the procedure of prize courts. Visit and search at sea-the principal 
method of contraband control-\vas confined to an examination of the ship's 
papers and the interrogation of crew members. .If the result of visit and 
search indicated an enemy destination, or a reasonable suspicion of enemy 
destination, the vessel and goods could be seized and placed in prize. 
Before the belligerent's prize court the normal procedure had been to re-
strict the evidence that could be brought forward in the first hearing to 
that provided by the vessel herself. The introduction of extrinsic evidence 
by the captor was generally permitted only if the preliminary hearing did 
not establish with sufficient clarity a proper case either for condemnation 
or for restitution. Hence, the primary burden was placed upon the captor 
to justify his act of seizure, and in this task the evidence he could generally 
bring forth was of a limited nature. 14 
It need hardly be pointed out that this system would seriously limit-if 
not frustrate altogether-any benefits to be derived from applying to contra-
band the principle of ultimate enemy destination, particularly in view of 
the present complexity of commercial transactions. In the case of vessels 
destined to a neutral port adjacent to enemy territory, carrying goods 
documented to the neutral port and consigned to persons in neutral terri-
tory, the ship's papers will generally reveal nothing concerning the ulti-
mate destination of the cargo. 15 The information required to establish 
enemy destination will almost always be of a very complex character and 
can be gathered-if at all-only through the vast intelligence facilities at 
the disposal of belligerent governments. In these circumstances intercep-
tion at sea can no longer possess its former significance. Instead of ascer-
taining through visit and search whether sufficient cause for seizure exists 
the normal procedure has been to intercept neutral vessels and to divert 
14 This, at least, had been the Anglo-American practice until it was abandoned by Great 
Britain in the prize rules issued by the British Government shortly before the outbreak of war 
in 1914. Formally, it still represents the procedure in American prize courts, as Hyde (op. cit., 
pp. 2.378-82.) points out, though American courts have been inactive in prize proceedings since 
the Spanish-American War. 
15 
"Modern facilities of communication, as well as the modern system of company organi-
zation and finance, have made it possible to conceal the truth of any commercial transaction 
under a thick coat of legal camouflage, and a boarding officer would merely be wasting his 
time if he tried to determine the real destination of a cargo from an examination of the manifest 
and the bills of lading." H. A. Smith, op. cit., p. 12.4. Of course, the falsification or forgery 
of papers has always been practiced. However, as Smith observes, the difference between 
former days and the present period "is that modern commerce and finance have:now made it 
possible completely to conceal the truth without recourse to such crude methods: as forgery." 
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them to a contraband control base. 16 Here, during the period of detention, 
information may be collected that will lead either to the release of the 
vessel and goods or to their seizure as prize. 17 
In the latter eventuality the procedure followed in both World Wars has 
been for the captor to initiate proceedings in prize by introducing any 
evidence that may serve to justify seizure and-possibly-condemnation. 
H the evidence introduced is regarded as sufficient to create a reasonable 
suspicion of ultimate enemy destination the claimant, in order to avoid 
condemnation, must refute the presumption of enemy destination thus held 
to arise by a positive showing that the cargo has a genuine neutral destina-
tion. Provided, then, that the belligerent can establish circumstances 
creating a reasonable suspicion of enemy destination the burden of proving 
an innocent destination is thrown upon the neutral claimant. 18 
In this connection the belligerent's task has been facilitated still further 
by the creation of a detailed set of presumptions governing hostile destina-
tion. Thus a presumption of enemy destination has been held to arise 
where goods are consigned" to order," or if the ships papers do not indicate 
the real consignee of the goods, or if goods are merely consigned to a dealer 
or agent and the ultimate buyer is unknown, or if the parties engaged in 
the transaction-though known-have or are suspected of having enemy 
16 At least this has been the normal procedure followed in the absence of the vessel's cargo 
being covered by a navicert (see pp. 2.81-2.). 
17 The mea.sures by which belligerents, and principally Great Britain, sought to mitigate the 
inconvenience thereby caused to neutral shippers through forced diversion and detention in 
contraband control bases will be considered in later pages. The legality of diversion for 
search (and even for visit) is now generally accepted, though when initiated in World War I 
it could not be said to have had legalsanction(seepp. 338-43). Nor should the primary purpose 
of compulsory deviation be obscured by belligerent claims-although in part justified-that 
the dangers attending visit and search at sea, as well as the increased size of vessels, required 
the adaptation of traditional methods to these novel circumstances. For the practice of com-
pulsory deviation was essentially a result of the belligerent need to detain a vessel for a period 
of time sufficient either to work up an adequate case for seizure in prize or to establish the 
innocent destination of the cargo. 
18 In British prize law this principle was. clearly laid down in World War I in The Louisiana 
and Other Ships [1918], 5 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. 2.52.. During World War II the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council reaffirmed the principle in the following terms: ". • . the captor must 
show that the case is one involving reasonable suspicion. If they do so, and if no claim is 
made, or if the claim fails, the court will in due course condemn the property as prize, but on 
the side of the claimants positive proof to the satisfaction of the court is exacted. ·. . The 
contrast between the two sides is sometimes explained as depending on the onus of proof. In 
a sense that may be a true description, but more exactly the difference depends on what is the 
case of either side. The captor has to maintain his seizure by showing the case of reasonable 
suspicion in order to justify what he did. The claimant has to establish by evidence of fact 
his affirmative case, which he can do in any case like this by showing the precise character o.f 
the adventure and showing that the ostensible destination is the real destination." The Monte 
Contes [1943], Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1943-45), Case No. 196, 
PP· 544-5· 
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connections .19 In any of the foregoing circumstances the inference of 
an ultimate enemy destination has been strong and could be displaced 
only by a positive showing that the goods in ques tion had an innocent 
destination. 20 
Nor has it been considered sufficient to establish that neither the shipper 
nor the nominal consignee intended to supply an enemy V\ri th contraband of 
vvar. In applying the principle of ultimate enemy destination it is not the 
intention of the neutral claimant in whose possession the goods are at the 
time of seizure that has been decisive but rather the intention of those who 
have-or will have-control over the ultimate destination of the goods. 21 
And so long as an ultimate enemy destination is held to exist at the time of 
seizure, condemnation has been considered justified. 22 This has also im-
plied the abandonment of restraints that formerly resulted from considering 
the act of contraband carriage as necessarily constituting a single com-
mercial transaction. In considedng the question of final destination as 
decisive goods have been condemned that were intended to pass through a 
number of intermediate transactions in a neutral state before reaching an 
enemy. It may be, for example, that goods are immediately destined to a 
neutral country to be there transformed from raw materials into manu-
factured articles, then to be re-exported to an enemy. In these circum-
19 In World War I Great Britain, by a series of Orders in Council, established a number of 
such presumptions relating to enemy destination. The most comprehensive of these Orders in 
Council, that of July 7, I 916, declared that: "The hostile destination required for the condemna-
tion of contraband articles shall be presumed to exist, unril the contrary is shown, if the goods 
are consigned to or for an enemy authority, or an agent of the enemy State, or to or for a person 
in a territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to or for a person who, during the 
present hostilities, has forwarded contraband goods to an enemy authority, or an agent of the 
enemy State, or to or for a person in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or if the 
goods are consigned to 'order', or if the ship's papers do not show who is the real consignee of 
the goods." U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I94r4J, p. 49 (and see pp. 
42.-69 for a general review of enemy destination in World War I). The Prize Court in Great 
Britain has added to these presumptions, and an illuminating survey may be found in Colombos, 
op. cit., pp. 198 ff. 
20 Of course, the captor may still fail to establish a case sufficiently strong to warrant con-
demnation by a prize court. But so long as "reasonable suspicion" can be shown to have 
existed at the time of seizure the belligerent cannot be held liable for losses incurred as a result 
of seizure. Nor is it actually necessary, from the belligerent's point of view, to obtain con-
demnation. It is sufficient merely to obtain possession of the goods and thus to deprive the 
enemy of their use. This may be accomplished, for example, either by the sale of the goods or 
by their requisition during the period they are being held in prize. For a further discussion of 
these-and related-points, seep. 346 (n). 
21 "When an exporter ships goods under such conditions that he does not retain control of 
their disposal at the port of delivery, and the control, but for their interception and seizure, 
would have passed into the hands of some other persons, who had the intention either to sell 
them to an enemy government or to send them to an enemy base of supply, then the doctrine 
of continuous voyage becomes applicable, and the goods on capture are liable to condemnation 
as contraband." The Norne and Other Vessels [192.1], 9 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. 42.7. 
22 Though, of course, account has been taken of events occurring after seizure. 
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stances British prize law has not considered such goods as having been 
legitimately incorporated into the " common stock" of the neutral country, 
but ultimately intended for an enemy, hence liable to seizure and con-
demnation. 23 
Finally, a presumption of enemy destination has been held to arise where 
goods being imported into a neutral country are found to be in appreciable 
excess of the state 's normal import requirements . It is this presumption 
that has provided the most striking, and certainly the most controverted, 
development in the expansion of belligerent claims to control neutral trade 
in contraband. In effect, the belligerent has sought by this method to 
ration the imports of neutral states. Whereas the presumptions of enemy 
destination described above still attempt to preserve a connection-however 
tenuous-with the traditional system, the presumption that has as its basis 
the fact that a neutral state has exceeded its normal import requirements 
would appear to have abandoned this attempt altogether. Up to this point 
the application of the principle of ultimate enemy destination remains based 
upon the assumption that whatever may transpire between the initial ship-
ment of goods and their final destination the events that must be inquired 
into form a single chain of occurrences-though not necessarily a single com-
mercial transaction-dealing with a particular shipment of goods. Ad-
mittedly this sequence of events has become very complex, and the possi-
bility of establishing-or even inferring-a discernible connection has 
correspondingly declined. For this reason the number of circumstances 
held to create a presumption of enemy destination has increased. Never-
theless, these presumptions do relate to a particular shipment of goods. 24 
In this final presumption, though, based as it is upon the fact of excessive 
23 Thus in one instance it was declared that "the notion that leather, imported to a neutral 
country (Sweden) for the express purpose of being at once turned into boots for the enemy 
forces, becomes incorporated in the common stock of the neutral country, is illusory. Instances 
can be given and multiplied which appear to reduce to an absurdity the argument that if work 
is done in the neutral country upon goods which are intended ultimately for the enemy, that 
circumstance of necessity puts an end to their contraband character, and prevents their being 
confiscable according to the doctrine of continuous voyage .. " The Balto [1917], 6 Lloyds Prize 
Cases, p. 148.-Less certain-though apparently not from the viewpoint of British practice-is 
the application of the principle of ultimate enemy destination to the practice of "substitution," 
i . e., of condemning goods destined to a neutral country which-though consumed therein-
have the effect of releasing a similar quantity of goods to an enemy. The problem.comes very 
close to the issues involved in "rationing," and may be distinguished from the_la~ter insofar 
as it is established that the same party receiving a particular shipment of goods was directly 
responsible for releasing a like quantity of the same goods to an enemy. Hence, it is not any 
general relationship between the import of goods into a neutral country in substitution for the 
release of similar goods to an enemy that here provides a basis for applying the principl~ of 
ultimate enemy destination; it is rather the specific relationship between the import and export-
in the form of substitution-of goods. 
24 And the ''highly probable destination'' that has been held to follow if these. presumptions 
are not clearly disproved, and which is sufficient to warrant condemnation, is a probability 
relating to a particular quantity of goods and based upon the facts attending its shipment. 
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neutral imports, attention is no longer directed to an enquiry into tracing a 
particular shipment of goods from i ts point of origin to its final destination. 
Instead, attention is directed to quantitative considerations, or, more 
precisely, to a comparison between what is regarded as a neutral country's 
normal import requirements for a given comtnodity and the amount of 
goods actually being in1ported. Once it has been determined that the 
latter exceeds nor1nal requirements a strong presutnption has arisen that 
the surplus goods are either themselves ultimately destined to an enemy 
or that their importation into the neutral country would serve to release a 
like quantity of similar goods. In a word, the presumption is in the nature 
of a statistical probability, drawn from a detailed analysis of a neutral 
state's trading pattern and applied to a particular shipment of goods. 25 
And although there are apparently no cases in which prize courts have 
condemned goods solely on the basis of a "statistical presumption," it is 
nevertheless certain that such presp.mption has formed an important, and 
perhaps even the decisive, consideration in a number of instances. It is 
clear that prize courts (e. g., in Great Britain) have considered statistical 
presumptions as providing sufficient basis for seizure and for throwing 
upon the owner the burden of establishing that effective steps had been 
taken to insure that goods entering a neutral port would never reach an 
enemy destination. 26 
25 It is scarcely possible to discuss in any detail the many problems-legal and political-
arising in connection with presumptions having a statistical probability as their basis. In a 
noteworthy discussion of so-called "rationing" policies (as well as other methods of contra-
band control), Sir G. G. Fitzmaurice ("Some Aspects of Modern Contraband Control and the 
Law of Prize," B. Y. I. L., 2.2. (1945), pp. 8_9-95) has indicated some of the difficulties involved 
in fixing-whether through agreement with the neutral country or through belligerent imposi-
tion-the neutral's "reasonable domestic needs, having regard to all the circumstances, in-
cluding manufacture for export to innocent destinations." In wartime "all sorts of factors 
may operate to justify a neutral in importing more than its normal peace-time requirements of a 
given commodity." Yet it does not appear to carry matters very far by saying of these diffi-
culties that they involve "the question whether some revision of the concept of what constitutes 
enemy destination is not called for under modern conditions.'' Given the transformation that 
has already been effected by belligerent application of the principle of ultimate enemy desti-
nation the only "revision" left to belligerents is to consider neutral territory-as such-to be 
assimilated to the concept of enemy destination-in brief, to cut off all neutral trade on the 
theory that some part of this trade might eventually find its way to an enemy. 
26 
.. It appears to be settled ... that an adequate 'statistical' case will per se (i. e., even in 
the absence of any suspicion attaching to the consignment on grounds specially connected with 
it as such) justify seizure and place upon the owner the burden of proving innocence, so that 
no damages can be recovered against the Crown in respect of the seizure. On the other hand, 
no case has as yet occurred where goods have been condemned on statistical evidence alone." 
Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 91. Generally speaking, it has been considered desirable, for obvious 
reasons, to base condemnation on other grounds as well, and not upon a statistical probability 
alone. Besides, fro111 a practical point of view, it may be quite sufficient only that seizure 
can be justified, for-as earlier noted-once goods have been seized the liklihood of their ever 
leaving the captors jurisdiction is small. 
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C. CONSEQUENCES OF CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND 
Neutral merchant vessels engaged in the carriage of contraband, or 
reasonably suspected of being so engaged, are liable to seizure. 27 This 
liability begins from the time the vessel leaves a neutral port with the 
contraband and terminates only upon completion of the voyage. 28 
In considering the further consequences attached to the carriage of con-
traband a distinction n1ust normally be made between the vessel and the 
contraband cargo. \Vith respect to the contraband goods there is no 
question but that they are always subject to condemnation. Also subject 
to condemnation, according to the practice of some states, are the non-
contraband goods that bear a common ownership with the noxious cargo. 29 
Less settled are the rules governing the fate of the vessel seized while 
engaged in the carriage of contraband. 30 Whereas some states have tra-
ditionally placed primary etnphasis upon the element of knowledge on the 
part of the owner (or master) of the vessel, 31 other states have stressed the 
27 Even if carrying no contraband goods the neutral vessel may nevertheless be liable to 
seizure if she is herself considered to be contraband. In both World Wars vessels (and aircraft) 
were placed in the category of absolute contraband.-For a further discussion of visit and search 
as well as the varying circumstances under which seizure at sea is justified, see pp. 332. ff. 
28 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 63Id. Note should also be taken of the British and 
American practice of holding that seizure of the vessel is permitted even on her return voyage 
if it is found that the carriage of contraband goods was accomplished by means of fraud, e. g., 
by false or simulated papers. In this instance condemnation of the vessel will also follow. 
29 This according to the so-called doctrine of infection which, as Colombos (op. cit., p. 2.2.2.) 
points out, "concerns strictly the ownership of the goods, and it is 'common' ownership which 
leads to the confiscation of the innocent cargo. Condemnation is an incident of the owner's 
position. It is not an incident of the quality or nature of the goods." The Declaration of 
London endorsed the principle of infection, and Article 42. declared that: ''Goods which belong 
to the owner of the contraband and are on board the same vessel are liable to condemnation.'' 
Great Britain has always followed this rule, as has the United States, and despite the traditional 
opposition of continental countries a number of these states have, in recent years, included the , 
principle in their prize codes. In practice, however, the doctrine of infection can have only a 
limited significance today in view of developments in the conception of contraband. 
30 The loss of freight and other expenses now appears to constitute the minimum common 
penalty imposed upon a vessel seized for ·carriage of contraband. It is beyond this point that 
diversity may be found. 
3l This has been the position of Great Britain and-in large measure-of the United States. 
Thus Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., p. 82.6): "Great Britain and the United States. of America 
confiscated the vessel when the owner of the contraband was also the owner of ~he vessel; 
they also confiscated such part of the innocent cargo as belonged to the owner of the contraband 
goods; they, lastly, confiscated the vessel, although her owner was not the owner of the contra-
band, if the vessel sailed with false papers for the purpose of carrying contraband, or if the 
vessel was by a treaty with her flag State under an obligation not to carry the goods concerp.ed 
to the enemy and the owner knew that his vessel was carrying contraband." Yet even where 
the owner has knowledge of the carriage of contraband Anglo-American practice has gener.ally 
required such contraband to form a substantial proportion of the whole cargo; hence the element 
of proportionality is not altogether excluded. 
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proportion of contraband carried by the vessel. 32 The Declaration of 
London reflected the latter practice in stating that a vessel carrying contra-
band "may be condemned if the contraband, reckoned either by value, 
weight, volume, or freight, forms more than half the cargo;" 33 and 
although this rule has not yet been endorsed by the prize codes of all 
states it may be regarded as having succeeded in obtaining widespread 
acceptance. 34 
32 Though continental European countries have required that the contraband form a certain 
percentage of the cargo-whether by volume, weight or value-the proportion required has 
varied from one-fourth to three-quarters, and in certain states the element of knowledge-
through presumption, at least-formed an additional requirement. 
33 Article 40. But Hyde (op. cit., p. 2161) observes that this rule should not "be deemed 
necessarily to forbid condemnation of the ship if the owner thereof has knowledge that goods 
constituting a substantial part of the cargo are contraband. Nor should he be permitted to 
profit from lack of such knowledge if he has chartered the vessel on a time charter to one who 
is notorious in supplying contraband to a bdligerent, if at the time of capture the vessel was 
being employed as a vehicle of transportation on such a mission." 
u British prize law still insists upon condemnation of the vessel being dependent upon the 
element of knowledge, despite the fact that the Order in Council of July 7, 1916 declared 
Article 40 of the Declaration of London as applicable against all vessels seized for carriage of 
contraband. In practice, this continued insistance upon the complicity of the owner is qualified 
in its effects by requiring the latter to take reasonable precautions to insure that his vessel is 
not used for the carriage of contraband. And Colombos (op. cit., p. 225) points out that: "No 
immunity is, of course, available to a shipowner who charters his vessel and does not concern 
himself with the cargo. A neutral shipowner must see to it that his vessel is not used for the 
purpose of conveying contraband goods to one of the belligerents. Feigned or deliberate 
ignorance on his part does not afford any protection." One important reason for presuming 
knowledge will be the propordon of the cargo carried that consists of contraband. Hence 
the rule enunciated in the Declaration of London (which is also based, in a sense, upon a pre-
sumption of knowledge on the part of the owner) and the position still maintained in British 
prize law will frequently lead to similar results. Such divergence as will occur follows from 
those cases where, on the one hand, contraband is carried without the knowledge and against 
the will of the owner, and, on the other hand, where carriage of contraband is accomplished 
by means of fraud in which the owner either actively participates or has an interest. Regardless 
of the proportion of the cargo that is contraband, in the former instance the vessel is not 
condemned, whereas in the latter instance it will always be condemned (even if seized on its 
return voyage after having disposed of the contraband goods). 
Finally, brief mention should be made of the circumstance in which a vessel is encountered 
carrying contraband, though unaware of the outbreak of war or of contraband declarations 
applicable to the cargo. On this point, Article 43 of the Declaration of London has been 
generally accepted. Article 43 states: 
"If a vessel is encountered at sea making a voyage in ignorance of the hostilities or of the 
declaration of contraband affecting her cargo; the contraband is not to be condemned except 
with indemnity; the vessel herself and the remainder of the cargo are exempt from condemnation 
and from the expenses referred to in Article 41. The case is the same if the master after becoming 
aware of the opening of hostilities, or of the declaration of contraband, has not yet been able 
to discharge the contraband. 
A vessel is deemed to be aware of the state of war, or of the declaration of contraband, if she 
left a neutral port after there had been made in sufficient time the notification of the opening of 
hostilities, or of the declaration of contraband, to the power to which such port belongs. A 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
As between the belligerents it is doubtful whether any of the develop-
ments occurring in the law of contraband since 1914 can be regarded as 
unlawful, even as judged solely by the standards of the traditional law. It 
is true that occasionally the argument has been pressed that a belligerent 
in endeavoring to seize all goods destined to an enemy state, including 
goods intended for consumption by the civilian population, thereby 
violates the principle requiring a distinction to be drawn between the 
treatment of combatants and non-combatants. 35 However, to the extent 
that the distinction in question has served to restrict inter-belligerent 
behavior in warfare at sea such restriction has sought primarily to prohibit 
belligerents from endangering the lives of enemy non-combatants by making 
them the objects of direct attack. 36 On the other hand, in exercising his 
undoubted right to seize and to confiscate enemy private property found at 
sea a belligerent is not considered to violate the combatant-non-combatant 
distinction. Nor is this distinction violated by exercise of the belligerent 
right to blockade the ports and even the entire coast of an enemy; though it 
is clear that the effects of blockade weigh as heavily upon non-combatants 
as upon combatants. These measures have long formed an accepted part 
of the law governing naval hostilities. They are believed to provide a 
clear answer to the contention that a belligerent violates any obligation 
toward an enemy in shutting off imports intended for consumption by the 
civil population. 37 
As between belligerent and neutral the matter is admittedly altogether 
different, and no doubt it is from the neutral that the challenge to belligerent 
practices must come-if at all. In considering the validity of neutral 
claims, however, it will be useful not only to refrain from finding in the 
traditional law of contraband general principles where none have existed 
but also to abstain from imputing a degree of certainty-and precision-to , 
vessel is also deemed to be aware of a state of war if she left an enemy port after the opening of 
hostilities." 
Article 43 does not prevent seizure, however, where vessels are encountered carrying contra-
band of war. The ultimate disposition of the vessels and goods-in accordance with Article 
43-falls upon the prize courts. 
35 "While the exigencies of belligerency must primarily control the definition of contraband, 
and therefore to a great extent settle the list of contraband merchandise, there is a point at 
which accepted law offers a barrier to further dictation on their part. Except to the limited 
degree which has been indicated in treating of belligerent rights, acts of war cannot be directed 
against the non-combatant population of an enemy state. Hence seizure of articles of com-
merce becomes illegitimate so soon as it ceases to aim at enfeebl_ing the naval and military 
resources of the country and puts immediate pressure upon the civil population." E. W. Hall, 
A Treatise On International Law, p. 656. . 
36 The status of these restrictions has been examined elsewhere (see pp. s6-7o) and bears 
no direct relation to the contention under present consideration. 
37 Assuming, of course, that a reasonably clear distinction can even be drawn between the 
combatant and the civilian enemy population. 
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such principles as have existed. The law of contraband has not been the 
product of any overarching principle, save perhaps the principle of com-
promise. For this reason it must prove as mistaken to consider the develop-
ment of this law-whether past or present-from the viewpoint of the 
neutral's interests as to consider i t from the viewpoint of the belligerent 's 
interests. Still further, such general principJes as did undoubtedly form 
a part of this law were frequently marked by controversy, both as to their 
content and their manner of application. Thus there has never been clear 
agreement over the discretion allowed a belligerent in determining the 
character and extent of his contraband lists. Nor has there ever been any 
marked consensus upon the limits, if any, to the belligerent's right of 
determining the procedural rules that are to govern the conduct of its prize 
courts, even though these rules are frequently as important in controlling 
neutral trade as the substantive rules of prize. 38 
At the very least, this uncertainty has made it difficult for neutrals to 
challenge the belligerent contention that the traditional law of contraband 
provides a broad framework within which specific measures taken by 
belligerents may vary as the circumstances of war vary. In particular, 
these circumstances have been held to determine both the scope of articles 
regarded as susceptible of use in war and the possibility of applying the 
traditional distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. 39 
The real difficulty though in any attempt to assess the present status of the 
law of contraband must be found in the principle-or, more precisely, in the 
manner of applying the principle-of ultimate enemy destination. As to 
the validity of the principle itself there can no longer be any real doubt; 
38 As might be expected belligerents have usually contended-as did Great Britain in World 
War !-that changes in prize court procedure form a matter of national-not international-
law, and therefore fall within the discretion of the belligerent. The contention has been just 
as frequently denied by neutral states, though generally without success. Whatever the 
merits of the controversy it is clear that many changes considered by belligerents as merely 
procedural in character have had a pronounced bearing upon the effectiveness of substantive 
rules of prize (admittedly a matter of international concern). If the qecision to apply the prin-
ciple of ultimate enemy destination to contraband represents a change in the substantive law-
which it clearly does-then the effective application of this principle has been made possible 
largely through changes of an allegedly procedural character. Thus the various rules-dis-
cussed in preceding pages-establishing presumptions of enemy destination have often been 
described as of a procedural nature, though it is certain that the effect of these presumptions in 
facilitating the control of neutral commerce can hardly be exaggerated. And if the Declara-
tion of London is to be regarded as generally reflecting the traditional position in this matrer 
it would appear that the creation of rules in which a presumption of enemy destination can be 
held to arise (even though rebuttable) is not a matter within the sole discretion of belligerents. 
39 And although it is true that the actual practices of belligerents during the two World 
Wars reduced the traditional framework to an empty shell, this fact probably cannot serve to 
refute the formal argument that the traditional framework nevertheless retains its validity 
and would once again be applicable, circumstances permitting. It is, of course, another 
matter to ask how relevant this formal argument may be in view of the conditions that presently 
3.ttend war's conduct. 
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goods ultimately destined for an enemy cannot escape seizure and conden1na-
tion merely because their immediate destination is to neutral territory. At 
the same time, experience has clearly shown that this principle cannot be 
given effective application by belligerents short of the resort to measures 
whose validity have been-and still are-seriously questioned. The result-
ing situation is therefore not without an element of paradox, since acquies-
cence in the principle of ultimate enemy destination has nevertheless been 
accompanied by controversy over measures designed to make the principle 
effective. These measures extend from the initial acts of interception and 
detention in a belligerent's contraband control base-while information is 
being gathered concerning the nature and destination of the cargo-to the 
final act of condemnation by means of a procedure that is admittedly based 
largely upon conjecture and the·· probability'' of enemy destination. 40 Yet 
it is not difficult to see that the retention of traditional methods in modern 
conditions would make nonsense of the principle of ultimate enemy destina-
tion. The belligerent has been confronted with the choice of either per-
mitting goods to enter neutral ports, part of which are certainly destined 
to find their way into enemy hands, or to impose rigid controls upon such 
commerce at the risk of interfering on occasion with what is undeniably 
legitimate neutral trade. 
In practice, this dilemma has been partially resolved (though only par-
tially) by the introduction of measures designed to reduce the inconvenience 
otherwise caused to neutrals engaged in lawful trade, while at the same time 
insuring that an enemy is prevented from obtaining any supplies useful in 
the prosecution of war. Thus agreements have been concluded between the 
belligerent 41 and associations of merchants in neutral states, whereby the 
latter have guaranteed that goods consigned to them would not reach an 
enemy. In turn, the belligerent has undertaken to refrain from interfering 
(save in exceptional circumstances) with such goods on their way to a 
neutral destination. 42 
Perhaps the most notable method-developed principally by Great 
Britain-for the regulation of trade between neutral states has been the so-
40 Thus the presumption of enemy destination that has as its basis a statistical probability 
may appear as far removed from any reasonable method to render effective the principle of 
ultimate enemy destination as it is possible to take. In fact, it is not, for it merely represents 
the final step in a process that has departed in ever increasing degree from a procedure de-
manding proof as to the destination of contraband goods to one based upon conjecture and 
the mere probability of enemy destination. 
41 Here again it has been primarily British practice that forms the basis for discussion. 
42 These agreements were first initiated by Great Britain in 1915 with the Netherlands Over· 
seas Trust. Thereafter merchant associations in other neutral states entered into similar agree-
ments. In 1939 the practice was revived. It should be noted that these agreements did pot 
preclude the inspection and acceptance of particular shipments through the use of the navicert 
system, discussed below. Nor did it prevent later seizure of cargoes in circumstances indicating 
an enemy destination. 
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called'' navicert'' system. 43 By submitting his cargo to investigation prior 
to sailing a neutral shipper might obtain a certificate, or navicert, from the 
belligerent's representative in the port of origin, stating that the cargo 
in~pected was of an innocent nature.. In the absence of any later circum-
stances that might raise independent cause for suspicion, a vessel carrying 
a fully navicerted cargo could expect to pass through the certifying belliger-
ent's contraband controls with a minimum of delay. 44 The system pro-
vided obvious benefits to both parties. To the neutral shipper it provided 
a means of avoiding the losses incurred through detention and delay at a 
belligerent contraband control base. To the belligerent the system pro-
vided a method for avoiding friction with neutrals, while reducing the 
burden placed on naval patrols and the work done at contraband control 
bases. 
Prior to July 31, 1940,45 the navicert was a facility voluntarily provided 
by the belligerent to neutral shippers, and one which the latter were under 
no legal compulsion to accept. The neutral shipper in refusing to make 
use of this facility was not, for that reason, subject either to seizure or to 
any other legal liability that a belligerent could not in any event already 
impose. 46 For this reason it has been argued that there is no legal basis 
for alleging that neutrals were compelled to obtain navicerts. This being 
so, it must remain entirely within the belligerent's discretion in deciding 
43 Developed in World War I (the best account of the earlier system being H. Ritchie·s, 
The Navicert System During The World War (1938)) the navicert system was again introduced 
by Great Britain in December 1939. For a brief though excellent account of World War II 
practice, see Malcolm Moos, "The Navicert In World War II,·· A.]. I. L., 38 (1944), pp. 115-9. 
44 The full benefits of the system could be realized only if the vessel carried no unnavicerted 
cargo at all; otherwise navicerted cargo would normally be subject to delay while inquiries 
were being made into the unnavicerted cargo. And Medlicott (op. cit., pp. 96-7) points out 
that during the first year of the 1939 war: "There was also the 'Ship Navicert", for which the 
master of a ship or his agent could apply when the whole cargo of the ship was covered by 
navicerts, and which was intended to minimize further the formalities of visit and search. 
Ships so covered could normally count on the formalities of visit and search being reduced to 
a minimum, and they were in fact usually given clearance at sea by a naval patrol. There was 
thus an important difference between a ship sailing with fully-navicerted cargo, and a ship 
sailing under cover of a ship navicert. In the latter case, the ship was not normally subject to 
any delay or inspection beyond that necessary for her identification; in the former case, the 
ship would, where possible, be cleared at sea without diversion to a control base, but only if the 
weather permitted boarding and if the ship were found to be carrying no mails or passengers. •• 
45 See pp. 313-5 for the Order in Council of July 31, 1940, which introduced substantial change 
in the navicert system. 
46 This, at least, was the belligerent"s (Great Britain) argument, though the legal controls 
it assumes a belligerent already possesses were precisely the measures that neutrals-particularly 
in World War !-objected to as being in excess of normal belligerent competence. As seen 
from the neutral· s point of view, then, the navicert system frequently was interpreted as imposing 
an unlawful constraint upon neutral shippers. In British prize law there are no decisions 
dealing with the navicert system until after the Order in Council of July 31, 1940 came into 
effect. As this order placed the system on a different basis the relevance of these decisions to 
the ~·voluntary• • system is limited. 
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whether to grant or to refuse navicerts to individual neutral shippers.47 
From the viewpoint of a strictly legal analysis this position would 
appear sound, although in practice the neutral shipper was under constraint 
to obtain a navicert, since the consequences following upon a refusal to do 
so were serious. 48 Even so, this system of" voluntary" controls exercised 
by a belligerent raises legal problems both for the neutral state that permits 
a belligerent to inspect cargoes within its territory 49 and-much more im-
portant-for the neutral trader who "voluntarily" submits to the system. 
The other belligerent may well consider such cooperation with an enemy's 
contraband control system as an act of unneutral service on the part of the 
neutral shipper, thereby making the vessel and cargo liable to seizure and 
condemnation. 50 At any rate, the voluntary system of navicerting neutral 
goods-with the other features attending its operation-ultimately proved 
insufficient to achieve the purpose of shutting off all overseas imports to 
Germany. Within less than a year after the outbreak of war in 1939 Great 
Britain had adopted a far more comprehensive system of controlling neutral 
trade, and a system that could no longer be termed voluntary in almost any 
sense of the term. The nature of that system will be dealt with in the 
following chapter on blockade. 
47 The above position is forcef~lly presented by Fitzmaurice (op. cit., pp. 83-85), who also 
observes: "Naturally, the navicert system is capable of grave abuse at the hands of an unscrupu-
lous belligerent, as for instance if navicerts were refused arbitrarily or capriciously or allocated 
with a view to the belligerents own commercial advantage, or as a means of bringing political 
pressure to bear. It would seem, however, that such abuses would be of a political and not a 
legal character, that they could be made the subject of diplomatic complaint on general and 
political grounds by the neutral government concerned, but that it would be difficult to allege 
a breach of any rule of international law." 
48 In addition to detention in a belligerent contraband control base, these consequences 
frequently included a denial to the shipper of belligerent controlled facilities. 
49 Occasionally neutral states have forbidden the operation of the navicert system within 
their territory. On the whole, British writers assert that the operation of the system in neutral 
territory should not be construed as a violation of neutrality, e. g., Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, 
op. cit., p. 855n. (3). Neither in World War I nor in World War II did the United States-
while a neutral-ever officially recognize the navicert system, though American shippers were 
permitted-and frequently encouraged-_to cooperate with this system of licensing neutral 
trade. And for the view that a neutral state in permitting the operation of the navicert system 
within its territory violates basic obligations of neutrality, namely the obligations to abstain 
from giving material support to either belligerent and to treat the belligerents impartially, 
see V. Bruns, "Der britische Wirtschaftskrieg und das geltende Seekriegsrecht," Zeitschrift fiir 
ausldndisches ojfentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 10 (1940), pp. Ioi-2.. Certainly, there is much to 
be said for the opinion that in permitting the operation of the navicert system within its 
territory a neutral provides the belligerent important assistance in the conduct of war. 
5o See pp. 32.2.-3, for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
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